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Abstract
This paper extends the previous literature on the intergenerational transmission of
human capital by exploiting variation in compulsory schooling reforms across nine
European countries over the period 1920–1956. My empirical strategy follows an
instrumental variable (IV) approach, instrumenting parental education with years of
compulsory schooling. I find some evidence of a causal relationship between parents’
and children’s education. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large: an additional
year of parental education raises the child’s education by 0.44 of a year. I also find that
maternal schooling is more important than paternal schooling for the academic
performance of their offspring. The results are robust to several specification checks.
JEL codes: I20, J62
Keywords: Intergenerational transmission; Human capital; SHARE
1 Introduction
The notion that there is a positive association between the educational outcomes of the
parents and their children is well documented. However, while there is a substantial
consensus on this intergenerational correlation, less is known about the existence of a
causal relationship underlying the transmission of education between generations (see,
for instance, Björklund and Salvanes 2010; Black et al. 2005; Oreopoulos et al. 2006).
On the policy side, to the extent that policymakers are concerned about early school
leavers, an analysis of themechanisms through which education is passed on from parents
to children is particularly relevant in light of reforms that extend the length of compulsory
schooling. For example, if there is evidence that parental education is responsible for chil-
dren’s performance in school, then interventions that improve the educational attainment
of less educated parents should lead to increased human capital among their children,
thus reducing the degree of inequality of opportunity in education.
However, the primary concern is that intergenerational educational estimates might
not adequately account for the correlation between parental schooling and some unob-
served, inherited characteristics that might affect the academic achievement of their
offspring. Such correlations would imply that the intergenerational transmission of edu-
cation could be primarily driven by selection rather than reflecting a causal relationship
running from a parent’s to a child’s education. To address this concern regarding endo-
geneity caused by omitted variables, the empirical literature has recently focused on three
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identification strategies: twin parents (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002); adopted chil-
dren (Björklund et al. 2006); Plug 2004; and instrumental variables (Black et al. 2005;
Oreopoulos et al. 2006).
In my study, I employ this latter IV approach that obtains identification from compul-
sory schooling laws that influence the educational distribution of the parents without
directly affecting the children. In particular, this study is strictly connected to the seminal
paper by Black et al. (2005), which, using the Norwegian schooling reforms during the six-
ties and early seventies, finds no evidence of a causal impact of parental education on the
next generation’s education, with the exception of the weak impact of maternal schooling
on educational attainment among sons. Similarly, Holmlund et al. (2011), applying this
methodology to Sweden, obtain results in line with Black et al. (2005). However, these
findings of limited effects of parental education in Norway and Sweden have not been
supported by studies for other countries (see, for example, Oreopoulos et al. 2006 for the
USA; Chevalier 2004 for the UK; andMaurin andMcNally 2008 for France). Perhaps these
contradictory results are related to the relatively low levels of inequality with respect to
economic and educational outcomes in Scandinavian countries.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. To my knowledge, there are
no studies that examine the causal effect of parental schooling on the human capital of
their children by exploiting the variation provided by compulsory schooling laws over
time and across European countries. Therefore, this paper adds to previous research by
using this source of exogenous variation in parental schooling to disentangle the direction
of causality. Another contribution of this paper is to shed new light on the different roles
played by mothers and fathers in explaining the transmission of education to their sons
and daughters. The findings from this multi-country analysis contribute to our under-
standing of how and why education is transmitted across generations by accounting for
the effects of different institutional and cultural environments in Europe. A key ele-
ment of my identification strategy is that it makes it possible to control for both country
fixed effects, which account for time-invariant characteristics across countries, and birth
cohort fixed effects for parents, which will capture any systematic difference in school-
ing outcomes across parental cohorts. To conduct this analysis, I draw data from the first
two waves (2004 and 2006) of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). This European dataset has three important features: first, it collects data on
the current economic, health, and family conditions of over 30,000 individuals aged fifty
and above in several European countries; second, it provides information on educational
attainment for two family generations; and finally, as it is designed to be cross-nationally
comparable, this dataset enables me to properly conduct a multi-country analysis. Fur-
thermore, I use data on reforms of the minimum school leaving age by relying on recent
studies (Brunello et al. 2009,2012; Garrouste 2010).
Based on these data, my main results demonstrate that: a) when omitting country-
specific trends, there is some evidence of a causal relationship between parents’ and
children’s education. The magnitude of the effect is large: an additional year of parental
education induced by the reform generates 0.44 years of additional schooling for their
children; b) when including country-specific trends, the estimated effects of parental edu-
cation are no longer statistically significant. I argue that this lack of statistical significance
can be explained by the fact that the addition of country-specific trends greatly reduces
the first stage power of my instrument; c) the mother’s schooling has a slightly stronger
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impact than that of her husband on the academic achievement of their offspring with or
without country-specific trends. These findings are robust to a number of specification
checks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the rel-
evant literature on the intergenerational transmission of education. Section 3 presents a
description of the data and illustrates the main features of European compulsory school-
ing reforms. Section 4 describes the empirical specification and identification strategy.
The main results of the paper are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 provides robust-
ness checks. I discuss the results in Section 7. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 8.
2 Literature review
Over the last decade, several empirical studies have attempted to shed some light on the
causal mechanism that underlies the relationship between parents’ and children’s educa-
tional outcomes. These studies have proposed different strategies to identify exogenous
variation in parental schooling. In the literature to date, there are three main research
streams investigating the causal effect of parental education on their offspring’s educa-
tion. These streams differ in their choice of identification strategy. Below, I present a brief
review of these studies and explain my contribution relative to the existing literature.1
The first strand of the literature examines the causal relationship between parental and
children’s education using data on pairs of identical twin parents to difference out not
only family fixed effects but also unobserved factors due to the parents’ genetics. One
of the first studies, by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002), compares the schooling of the
children of twin mothers and twin fathers who were identical in all characteristics except
their level of educational attainment. While Behrman and Rosenzweig’s findings sug-
gest a positive and large effect of the father’s schooling but no effect from the mother’s
schooling, Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) questione the validity of these results by
demonstrating their sensitivity to school coding schemes and sample selection rules.
The second stream of the literature estimates intergenerational schooling effects using
samples of parents and their adopted children. Sacerdote (2002) and Plug (2004) com-
pare adopted and natural children and conclude that environmental factors are important
for the intergenerational transmission of education. However, these studies were severely
limited by the paucity of data on the adopted children and a lack of information on the bio-
logical parents of adoptees. To overcome these issues, the literature has recently made use
of large registry datasets of adopted children, which are available in the Nordic countries.
In their study, Björklund et al. (2006) improve on the previous literature by employing
a unique administrative dataset of Swedish adoptees that allowed them to examine the
impact of both the adoptive and biological parents’ years of schooling on the adopted
child’s years of schooling. They find both the adoptive and the biological parents’ educa-
tion to be important. Overall, studies on adopted children emphasize the importance of
both genetic and environmental factors for a child’s success in school.
Finally, there is a strand of the literature based on instrumental variables. This IV
approach is the one I apply in this paper, and is closely related to the seminal paper by
Black et al. (2005), which utilizes the Norwegian schooling reforms that occurred in dif-
ferent municipalities for the period 1959–1973. This study provides little evidence for
the causal effects of parental education on children’s attainment. Overall, the authors
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conclude that the father’s schooling has no impact on children’s educational attainment
despite a positive, but small, intergenerational effect between mothers and their sons.
Similar results were obtained in a more recent paper by Holmlund et al. (2011) applying
the same strategy in Sweden. In contrast to these studies onNordic countries, Oreopoulos
et al. (2006), relying on variation in the school minimum age across states and time in the
US, demonstrate that increasing the education of either parent has a negative and signif-
icant effect on the probability that a child repeats a year of school. This decline in grade
repetition by children as a consequence of an increase in parental schooling is also found
in France (Maurin and McNally 2008). Using changes in the mandatory schooling laws
implemented in Britain during the seventies, Chevalier (2004) finds evidence of large,
positive effects of maternal education on her child’s education but no significant effects
of fathers’ education.
Taken together, these IV studies do not present a clear picture and reveal that, while
there is a large set of estimates of intergenerational mobility from a wide range of differ-
ent countries, the literature to date has not included a comparative analysis of educational
reforms undertaken at the country level. This observation strengthensmy claim that using
this variation in European compulsory schooling laws is a novel contribution to the lit-
erature that can improve our understanding of how and why parental education affects
children’s outcomes by accounting for institutional and cultural factors across different
European countries.
3 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the first two waves of the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which took place in 2004 and 2006 in nine
different European countries.2 This survey interviews individuals aged fifty and above
who speak the official language of each country, and do not live abroad or in an institu-
tion, plus their spouses or partners irrespective of age. The main advantage of this data
source is the representativeness of the sample of elderly people in Europe because this sur-
vey is constructed to ensure comparability of the analysis across the different countries.
Furthermore, this survey is harmonized with the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). The survey also contains detailed
information on a broad set of variables: demographics, socio-economic characteristics,
self-reported health as well as social and family networks. In this paper, I present evidence
for nine countries, for which I could compute some key educational variables. These
countries cover the various regions of continental Europe, ranging from Scandinavia
(Sweden and Denmark) through Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and
the Netherlands), and from the Mediterranean area (Italy) to Eastern Europe (Czech
Republic).
I also employ data on reforms in the minimum school leaving age across the above-
mentioned European countries, relying on recent works by Brunello et al. (2009,2012)
and Garrouste (2010). As in Brunello et al. (2012), Table 1 presents a historical overview
of the educational reforms that affected cohorts of parents from the 1930s until the late
1960s: for each country, the table reports the year of the reform,3 the pivotal cohort
(i.e., the year of birth of the first cohort affected by the reform), the change in the min-
imum school leaving age and in the years of compulsory schooling prescribed by the
law, and the age at school entry. It is worth noticing that the countries selected for this
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Table 1 Compulsory school reforms, by country
Country Reform Pivotal Change in min. Years of Age at
year cohort school leaving age comp. educ. school entry
Austria 1962/66 1951 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Belgium (Flanders) 1953 1939 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Czech Republic 1948 1934 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
1953 1939 15 to 14 9 to 8 6
1960 1947 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Denmark 1958 1947 11 to 14 4 to 7 7
France 1936 1923 13 to 14 7 to 8 6
1959/67 1953 14 to 16 8 to 10 6
Germany (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Bayern) 1969 1955 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Bremen) 1958 1943 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Hamburg) 1949 1934 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Hessen) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Niedersachsen) 1962 1947 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Nordrhein-Westfalen) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz) 1967 1953 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Saarland) 1964 1949 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) 1956 1941 14 to 15 8 to 9 6
Italy 1963 1949 11 to 14 5 to 8 6
Netherlands 1942 1929 13 to 14 7 to 8 6
1947 1933 14 to 13 8 to 7 6
1950 1936 13 to 15 7 to 9 6
Sweden 1949 1936 13 to 14 6 to 7 7
1962 1950 14 to 16 7 to 9 7
Notes: Source: Brunello et al. (2012). Notice that the year of the reform corresponds to the year when a certain reform was passed,
which may not be equal to year of implementation. For example, the Austrian reform of 1962 was implemented in 1966; the
French reform of 1959 was implemented in 1967. The pivotal cohort denotes the year of birth of the first cohort potentially
affected by the reform.
study have extended the school leaving age by one year or more, and that the Netherlands
and the Czech Republic experienced only a temporary reduction in the years of compul-
sory schooling.4 Strikingly, although Italy had a lower initial level of mandatory schooling
(5 years), it made substantial improvements during the postwar period (8 years). Note
also that, as the schooling reforms in theWest German states occurred at different points
in time, Table 1 presents information on these reforms at the state level.5
The key variables of interest in this analysis are the educational attainment of parents
and children. I measure educational attainment using years of schooling. One unusual
feature of the dataset I employ is that it contains direct information on years of schooling
for both parents and children. However, while for countries in the first wave the data
on years of education are provided and are defined according to the ISCED-97 criteria,6
for countries in the second wave there is information available on the country specific
ISCED-97 codes but not on years of education. In my analysis, the Czech Republic is the
only country included in the second wave that is not present in the first wave. I addressed
this lack of information on the Czech Republic by taking advantage of the country specific
conversion table that allowed me to recode the ISCED-97 codes into years of schooling.7
It is also important to note that the measurement error due to misreporting could be
magnified by the fact that children’s educational achievement is reported by their parents.
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To construct the sample of parents, I restrict attention to married or cohabiting indi-
viduals with at least one biological child, and, following Brunello et al. (2012), I focus on
the cohorts of parents born from 1920 through 1956.8 These cohorts were affected by
the reforms of mandatory schooling that gradually came into effect across the European
countries. By comparing the year of birth with the pivotal cohort, I am able to determine
whether parents were exposed to the changes in schooling laws. For the analysis of this
paper, it is worth stressing that I focus only on mothers and fathers who are the family
respondents, i.e., the first member of the couple interviewed, who was entitled to respond
to questions in the children’s section on behalf of the couple. This implies that, while
information on parental education was reported directly by both spouses, the data on
the children’s characteristics, such as years of schooling, were collected from the family
respondents.9 Therefore, parents who are not the family respondents are not considered
in my sample of parents. I then link the demographic and educational characteristics of
each child to the data for the corresponding family respondent to create an intergen-
erational dataset. Because the early cohorts of parents are likely to be affected by the
consequences ofWorldWar II that might have forced them to interrupt or delay their aca-
demic careers, in the robustness analysis I also construct a postwar sample that includes
the birth cohorts of parents born between 1935 and 1956, and show that the results are
robust to excluding the prewar cohorts.
In this paper, I restrict attention to first born children.10 The cohorts of interest were
born between 1956 and 1980. This interval presents two advantages: first, it guaran-
tees the absence of an overlap between parents and their offspring that could potentially
undermine the exclusion restriction of the instrument; second, it allows me to consider
sufficiently old children who were at least 24 years old at the time of the interview.11 The
distributions of the samples of parents and children across the countries are presented in
Table 2.
After these restrictions, the final full sample of parents consists of 6,184 family respon-
dents: 3,308 (53.5%) fathers and 2,876 (46.5%) mothers, while the final sample of children
consists of 6,184 siblings: 3,117 (50.4%) sons and 3,067 (49.6%) daughters.12 The summary
statistics reported in Table 3 indicate, as expected, that fathers are older and are slightly
more educated than their spouses. Particularly striking is that the second generation of
children has a considerably higher level of schooling than their parents (13.25 versus
Table 2 Sample of parents and children, by country
Sample Parents (1920–1956) Children (1956–1980)
Fathers Mothers Total Sons Daughters Total
Austria 312 170 482 225 257 482
Belgium 454 275 729 363 366 729
Czech Republic 360 363 723 363 360 723
Denmark 174 146 320 155 165 320
France 372 268 640 332 308 640
Germany 339 333 672 346 326 672
Italy 464 487 951 495 456 951
Netherlands 464 460 924 465 459 924
Sweden 369 374 743 373 370 743
Total 3,308 2,876 6,184 3,117 3,067 6,184
Notes: All the samples contain individuals for whom information on education is not missing.
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Table 3 Summary statistics, sample of Parents (1920–1956) and Children (1956–1980)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Children
Age 6,184 35.89 6.50
Education 6,184 13.25 2.84
Female (%) 6,184 0.49 0.5
Mothers and Fathers together
Age 6,184 61.85 7.19
Education 6,184 10.71 3.68
Household size 6,184 2.4 0.79
Fathers
Age 3,308 63.03 7.39
Education 3,308 10.98 3.74
Mothers
Age 2,876 60.50 6.69
Education 2,876 10.40 3.59
Notes: All the samples include individuals for whom information on education is not missing. Education is measured with years of
schooling and is defined according to the ISCED-97 criteria.
10.71 years of schooling). However, part of the positive association between parents’ and
children’s education might reflect the positive correlation with unobserved ability.
In Figure 1, I analyze differences in the pattern of educational attainment between the
cohorts of parents and children across countries. To facilitate comparisons, I separate
the countries into two groups: in one group, the Northern European countries (Sweden,
Denmark and the Netherlands, see Figure 1a); and in the other, the Western (Austria,
Germany, Belgium and France), Southern (Italy) and Eastern (Czech Republic) European
countries (see Figure 1b).13 The vertical and horizontal axes describe the average num-
ber of years of schooling and year of birth, respectively. The vertical dashed line marks
the year 1956 to separate the two samples. As one could expect, in all countries there is
a clear trend of rising levels of education, so that one might be concerned that it may be
difficult to distinguish the effect of the reform from the secular trend. Ideally, to thor-
oughly address this issue, one would like to rely on a very large sample of parents born in
the close vicinity of the schooling law. Unfortunately, the sample size of my dataset is too
small to conduct this local analysis.
4 Empirical specification
Following Black et al. (2005) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006), I specify a model for the
children’s education in a multi-country framework as follows:
Educihj = α + βEdupihj + γXihj + τp + τ c + ηj + pihj (1)
where the unit of observation i denotes the child-parent pair and the superscripts c and
p refer to child and parental characteristics, respectively. The dependent variable Educihj
denotes the years of schooling of the offspring generation, observed for child i within
household h residing in country j and is expressed as a linear function of parental edu-
cation levels measured by the years of schooling of the family respondent Edupihj. A key
element of my approach is the inclusion of both country fixed effects ηj that account
for time-invariant, unobserved characteristics, such as institutional and cultural features,
that are likely to vary by country, and birth cohort fixed effects for parents τ p (in 1-year
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Figure 1 Trend in education of Parents and Children. (a) Northern Europe. (b)Western, Southern and
Eastern Europe. Notes: The vertical and horizontal axes describe the average number of years of schooling
and year of birth, respectively. The vertical dashed line marks the year 1956 to distinguish between the
sample of parents (1920–1956) and children (1956–1980). Because in my sample there is only one Southern
European country (Italy) and only one Eastern European country (Czech Republic), I put these two countries
in a separate row together with the Western European countries.
intervals), which capture any systematic differences in school outcomes across parental
birth cohorts. In model (1), I then include birth cohort fixed effects for children τ c (in
1-year intervals) to control for cohort trends in education and account for the possibil-
ity that some children might not have finished school at the time of the interview.14 In
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some specifications, I also control for country-specific quadratic trends in parental birth
cohorts because the implementation of the schooling reforms might be correlated with
country-level, unobserved, time-varying factors. Because many of the socio-economic
characteristics of the parents tend to be endogenous, as they are themselves affected
by the parent’s education, I use a parsimonious specification: I add a set of individual
socio-demographic characteristics Xihj, including the children’s gender and household
size. Finally, ihj represents an idiosyncratic error term. It is reasonable to believe that ihj
is correlated with the outcome variable because it embodies the unobserved factors of
parents, including ability, which might affect the academic performance of the children.
To distinguish between the intergenerational effects of mothers and fathers, in model
(1) I also include the interaction between parental education and the gender dummy for
the parents. By including this interaction, I am able to capture the differential impacts
of maternal and paternal education on children’s education. Formally, I estimate the
following specification:
Educihj = α + βEdupihj + λEdupihj ∗ genderpihj + γXihj + τp + τ c + ηj + pihj (2)
where genderpihj is equal to one if the family respondent is the mother.
4.1 Identification strategy
I identify the causal effect of parental education on children’s education using compulsory
schooling laws over 30 years as an instrument for the number of years of parental school-
ing. A large body of economic literature (among others, Black et al. 2005; Oreopoulos
et al. 2006) recognizes this identification strategy as valid because changes in compulsory
schooling laws produce variation in parental education that is credibly exogenous and
unlikely to be related to unobservable characteristics of the parents, such as ability, that
might explain the different educational outcomes of their offspring.
In this study, I apply this IV strategy to a European framework by instrumenting
parental education with the number of years of compulsory schooling determined by the
law.15 This multi-country approach has been employed by Brunello et al. (2009) to study
the returns to schooling and Brunello et al. (2011) to investigate the effects of schooling











where the variable ycs represents the number of years of compulsory schooling, and the
superscripts B and A denote before and after the educational reform, respectively. There-
fore, I construct the instrument in such a way that it depends on three factors: the country
j in which the reform took place, the parents’ years of birth, and the first birth cohort
affected by the reform (i.e., the pivotal cohort). I can then determine whether parents
were exposed to the compulsory laws by comparing their years of birth with those of the
pivotal cohort.
Model (1) is estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS), and the first stage regression
is given by:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Reformpij + πXihj + ϕp + ϕc + σj + υihj (4)
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where Edupihj is instrumented with Reform
p
ij, the compulsory years of schooling in the
respective country and cohort. Similarly, the first stage for model (2) can be written as:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Reformpij + δ2Reformpij ∗ genderpihj + πXihj + ϕp + ϕc + σj + υihj (5)
Therefore, in equation (5) I employ not only the years of compulsory schooling but also
the interaction between compulsory schooling and the gender of the parent as instru-
ments. There are two points to note on this instrumental variables strategy. First, because
it varies over parental cohorts and across countries, the instrument is affected by two
potential sources of serial correlation: within country over parental cohorts and across
countries for the same parental cohort. To mitigate this concern, I cluster all standard
errors by the country and cohort of the parents, thus allowing for arbitrary dependence
within country-cohort cells.16 Second, the compulsory schooling reforms do not affect
the entire population. Rather, these reforms influence only the least educated groups of
parents. As a consequence, this identification strategy allows me to recover a Local Aver-
age Treatment Effect (LATE) instead of averages across the population (ATE).17 As noted
by Card (2001), these local effects are of interest because the groups of individuals cap-
tured by the LATE are those that aremost likely to be affected by themandatory schooling
laws.
5 Main results
5.1 Association between the schooling of Parents and their Children
Table 4 presents the results from a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of
model (1). In column 1, I report the coefficient of parental education without other con-
trols: the OLS estimate suggests that a one year increase in the parents’ years of schooling
is associated with an increase in the number of years of schooling for children of 0.32
years. This coefficient is significant and robust to the inclusion of controls for parental
Table 4 Effects of Parents’ education, naive OLS
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child’s education
Parental education 0.325*** 0.327*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.286***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Female (child) 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.225*** 0.225***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
Household size -0.135*** -0.121*** -0.170*** -0.176***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Socio-demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort F.E. for parents No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes
Cohort F.E. for children No No No Yes Yes
Country-specific quadratic trends No No No No Yes
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.178 0.190 0.228 0.243 0.247
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84
Notes: Birth cohort dummies for parents and children are in 1-year intervals. Country-specific quadratic cohort trends are
computed by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies. Standard errors clustered at the parents’
country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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birth cohort and socio-demographic characteristics (column 2) including the gender of
the children and household size. When controlling separately for country fixed effects
(column 3) and cohort fixed effects for children (column 4), parental education remains
positively and significantly associated with children’s education, although the coefficients
are slightly reduced to 0.30 and 0.29, respectively. I then include a full set of country
indicators interacted with a quadratic trend in the parents’ year of birth (column 5). The
results are virtually unchanged relative to the previous specification.
To allow for separate effects of maternal and paternal education, I estimate model (2),
in which I include the interaction between parental education and a female dummy that
takes value one if the family respondent is the mother. The estimates for the most general
specification are reported in Table 5. Column 1 corresponds to column 5 of Table 4. The
inclusion of the interaction term (see column 2) reduces the magnitude of the coefficient
on parental education, but the OLS estimate remains positive and significant.While I find
only a slightly stronger relationship between maternal education and children’s outcomes
than between the children’s and paternal education, the coefficient on the interaction
term is highly statistically significant. Interestingly, this positive sign is consistent with
the view (see, for example, Black et al. 2005; Chevalier 2004, Chevalier et al. 2011) that
mothers are likely to devote more time to child care than fathers. This finding is discussed
later in the paper. Finally, in Table 5, I present similar results from dividing the sample
into sons (column 3) and daughters (column 4).
Overall, my OLS estimates confirm a strong, positive intergenerational correlation in
education even when country fixed effects are controlled for and the sample is divided
into sons and daughters. However, this positive correlation could be explained by the
role family background characteristics played in determining the children’s level of edu-
cational attainment, or it might reflect genetic differences in ability that are transmitted
to the children. In the next subsection, I attempt to establish whether this positive
correlation has a causal interpretation.
Furthermore, it is not surprising that in all specifications I do find a negative and statis-
tically significant correlation between family size and children’s schooling performance.
In the more comprehensive specification (see column 5 in Table 4), a one unit increase in
Table 5 Effects of Parents’ education on sons and daughters, naive OLS
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Child’s education
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Parental education 0.286*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.228***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Household size -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.154** -0.176***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.063) (0.055)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals)
and country-specific quadratic cohort trends (computed by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country
dummies). Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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the household size is associated with a 0.18 years decline in child education. This result
appears to be in line with the notion that theremight be a trade-off between child quantity
and quality (Becker and Lewis 1973).
5.2 Causality between schooling of the Parents and their Children
In Panel A of Tables 6, 7 and 8, I present the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates,
which are the primary estimates of interest in this study. To instrument for parental edu-
cation, I use years of compulsory schooling. Table 6 (Panel A) indicates that, in the first
two specifications, the coefficient on parental education is strongly statistically significant
(at the 1 percent level); adding country fixed effects (column 3) and cohort fixed effects
for children (column 4) to the model reduces the significance of the 2SLS estimate, but it
is maintained at the 10 percent threshold. The magnitude of the effect of parental edu-
cation varies remarkably with the specification and becomes substantially larger when
country fixed effects are added to the model (see column 3).
As emphasized by Holmlund et al. (2011), for the validity of the instrument to hold,
it is important to control not only for country fixed effects but also for country-specific
time trends to disentangle the identifying variation in parental education induced by the
Table 6 Effects of Parents’ education, IV analysis
Panel A: 2SLS
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child’s education
Parental education 0.281*** 0.367*** 0.498** 0.437* 0.468
(0.057) (0.054) (0.254) (0.262) (0.334)
Female (child) 0.206*** 0.224*** 0.229*** 0.238***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.069)
Household size -0.114** -0.123*** -0.150*** -0.159**
(0.048) (0.044) (0.056) (0.069)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.175 0.188 0.179 0.214 0.202
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84
First stage F statistic 42.99 38.23 8.58 7.47 1.63
Panel B: First stage
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parent’s education
Compulsory education 0.632*** 0.604*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 0.104
(0.096) (0.098) (0.074) (0.076) (0.081)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.062 0.081 0.221 0.258 0.262
For all panels:
Socio-demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort F.E. for parents No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes
Cohort F.E. for children No No No Yes Yes
Country-specific quadratic trends No No No No Yes
Notes: Birth cohort dummies for parents and children are in 1-year intervals. Country-specific quadratic cohort trends are
computed by interacting parental birth cohort and its square with country dummies. Standard errors clustered at the parents’
country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7 Effects of Parents’ education on Sons andDaughters, IVw/o country-specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s education
Parental education 0.437* 0.462* 0.553* 0.410
(0.262) (0.269) (0.300) (0.573)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.044*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.023)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 7.47 6.99 7.56 2.00
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s education
Compulsory education 0.207*** 0.226*** 0.301*** 0.153
(0.076) (0.077) (0.102) (0.094)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.048***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals)
and socio-demographic characteristics. The Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic refers to the first stage regression of parental
education; the first stage regression of parental education*female has much stronger power, thus the Angrist-Pischke first stage F
statistic is omitted. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 8 Effects of Parents’ education on Sons and Daughters, IV with country-specific
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Child’s education
Parental education 0.468 0.421 1.064 0.671**
(0.334) (0.272) (0.973) (0.334)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.047*** 0.079* 0.052***
(0.013) (0.043) (0.015)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.25 13.25 13.14 13.34
Std. Dev. of Dep. Var. 2.84 2.84 2.89 2.78
Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic 1.63 8.64 1.39 4.04
Panel B: First stage
Dep. Var.: Parent’s Education
Compulsory education 0.104 0.124 0.153 0.092
(0.081) (0.082) (0.109) (0.108)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.051*** -0.055*** -0.045***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals),
socio-demographic characteristics and country-specific quadratic cohort trends (computed by interacting parental birth cohort
and its square with country dummies). The Angrist-Pischke first stage F statistic refers to the first stage regression of parental
education; the first stage regression of parental education*female has much stronger power, thus the Angist-Pischke first stage
F-statistic is omitted. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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compulsory schooling reforms from the confounding factors that arise from country-
level, upward trends in educational attainment. When I add country-specific quadratic
trends in birth cohorts to the model (column 5), I find that the estimated effects of
parental education are no longer statistically significant. While this lack of significance
raises concerns about the ability of my analysis to properly distinguish between the com-
pulsory schooling effects and the positive trends in average educational attainment of the
parents, I argue below that this result can likely be explained by the fact that the inclu-
sion of country-specific trends markedly reduces the first stage power of my instrument.
Interestingly, this weak first stage relationship between the instrument and parental edu-
cation when including country-specific trends has also been found in Oreopoulos et al.
(2006), who point to the presence of contemporaneous trends of increasing both average
educational attainment of the parents and years of compulsory schooling.
Thus, I investigate the first stage estimates reported in Panel B of Table 6. These esti-
mates show that the reform is strongly and positively correlated with the number of years
of parental schooling and that its t statistic is above 2.7 even when conditioning on coun-
try and cohort fixed effects. One notable exception, however, is the model that includes
the country-specific trends (column 5), in which the first stage estimate is not statistically
different from zero, with the t statistic of approximately 1.3. Panel A of Table 6 also reports
the corresponding first stage F-test statistic for each specification that accounts for the
clustering of the standard errors at the parents’ country and cohort level. When subse-
quently including country fixed effects and cohort fixed effects for children (columns 3
and 4), this statistic falls to approximately 7.5, which is below the cutoff value of 10 sug-
gested by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997), but this value is substantially
higher than the first stage F-test statistic produced by the model that incorporates the
country-specific trends (column 5). Because of the lack of power in my identification
strategy after controlling for country-specific trends, I choose the specification that does
not allow for country-specific trends (see column 4 of Table 6, Panel A) as my preferred
one. In this model, my results reveal that parental education appears to have a large causal
effect on children’s education: I find that an additional year of parental education will raise
a child’s educational attainment by 0.44 of a year.
I also perform a number of weak-instrument robust tests that allowme to conduct infer-
ence that has the correct size even in the presence of weak instruments. The results of this
set of tests are presented in Table 9, which provides the Anderson-Rubin (AR) statistic
(Anderson and Rubin 1949) and, as a reference, the standard Wald test for specifications
3 and 4 in Panel A.18 As one could expect given the relatively low value of the first stage
regression F-test statistic, the AR p-value and confidence intervals are larger than the
non-robust Wald counterparts, but the differences are limited. Most importantly, the AR
p-value is still on the border of statistical significance at approximately the 10 percent
Table 9Weak-instrument robust tests for models (3) and (4) in Table 6 - Panel A
Endogenous variable: (3) (4)
Parents’ education
p-value 95% C. Set p-value 95% C. Set
Anderson-Rubin 0.069 [-0.054, 1.292] 0.134 [-0.216, 1.235]
Wald 0.049 [0, 0.996] 0.095 [-0.076, 0.951]
Notes:Wald test is not robust to weak instruments.
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threshold. These results imply that, even when accounting for the presence of a weak
instrument, the treatment effects of parental education remain marginally statistically
significant.
For the above reasons, and in light of the Angrist and Pischke (2009) claim that “just-
identified 2SLS is approximately unbiased”, I conclude that in my preferred specification
(see Table 6, Panel A, column 4) the issue of weak instrument bias may be of less concern,
and that there is some evidence of a causal effect of parental education on the educational
attainment of their children. Table 10 summarizes the results of my favorite model. The
first column reports the OLS estimates from a regression of the child’s education on the
education of the parents. In the second column, I display the reduced form coefficient
from a regression of the child’s education on the instrument. In the third column, I present
the first stage estimate from a regression of parents’ education on the instrument. In the
last column, I present the 2SLS estimate, where years of compulsory schooling are used
as an instrument for parents’ education. This latter estimate is simply the reduced form
estimate divided by the first stage estimate.
While the main goal of this study is the analysis of the effect of parental education on
the second generation’s education, another contribution is the exploration of the different
roles fathers and mothers play in explaining the transmission of human capital to their
sons and daughters. To conduct this analysis, I proceed in two steps.
First, by adding an interaction between the gender of the parent and parental education
to the model (see model (2)), I am able to partially extend the analysis by allowing for dif-
ferent effects of maternal and paternal education. This means that my preferred model
(see Table 6, Panel A, column 4) uses as instruments not only the years of compulsory
schooling but also interaction term between compulsory schooling and the gender of the
parent. The 2SLS estimates, reported in Panel A of Table 7, suggest that when control-
ling for the differential impacts of mothers and fathers (see column 2), the results remain
substantially unchanged with respect to the direction, magnitude and significance. Con-
sistent with the results of the OLS estimates, I find that the coefficient on the interaction
between years of education and parental gender is highly statistically significant (at the 1%
level) and positive, thus suggesting that maternal education is somewhat more important
than paternal.
Table 10 Effects of parental education in the preferredmodel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Reduced-form First stage IV
Dependent variable: Child’s education Child’s education Parental education Child’s education
Parental education 0.286*** 0.437*
(0.011) (0.262)
Compulsory education 0.091 0.207***
(0.061) (0.076)
Observations 6,184 6,184 6,184 6,184
R2 0.243 0.141 0.258 0.214
First stage F statistic 7.47
Anderson-Rubin test p-value 0.134
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals),
and socio-demographic characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in
parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Second, in an attempt to disentangle the treatment effects of parental schooling on sons
from the effects on daughters, I separately consider samples of male and female children.
The results for sons and daughters are presented in columns 3 and 4 (Table 7, Panel A),
respectively. When conducting the analysis for sons, the coefficient on parental educa-
tion is statistically significant and larger than the coefficient generated by the full sample
(0.55 versus 0.46 years), although the effect is less precisely estimated given the smaller
sample size. On the contrary, when examining the sample of daughters, the 2SLS estimate
for parental education falls to approximately 0.41 and is not statistically different from
zero. In columns 3 and 4, I also find evidence that maternal education seems to matter
more than paternal education in determining the educational success of their offspring. I
explain these findings in the discussion of the results.
The non-significant effects of parental education on daughters can be largely attributed
to the weak first stage relationship between the reform and number of years of parental
schooling (see Table 7, Panel B, column 4): the t statistic for the reform is approximately
1.6 for daughters compared to approximately 3 for sons (column 3). Furthermore, the
Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test statistic is approximately 2 for daughters compared to
approximately 7.6 for sons.19 The first stage estimates also reveal that the reform had a
stronger impact on fathers.
In Table 8, I repeat the analysis in Table 7 using the country-specific quadratic trends:
the coefficient on parental education is statistically significant, although very noisy, only
for the sample of daughters. As expected, in the first stage regression (see Table 8, Panel B)
the reform shows no evidence of being correlated with parental schooling. Interestingly,
the coefficient on the interaction term between the gender of the parent and parental
education remains statistically different from zero across all specifications, thus support-
ing the basic finding that mothers have a significant stronger effect than fathers on the
academic outcomes of their offspring.
Regardless of the model, I find that the IV estimates are larger than their OLS counter-
parts. While this result might appear to contradict intuition regarding omitted variable
bias given the positive correlation between parental education and unobserved ability, it is
consistent with several studies that employ mandatory schooling reforms as instrument.
Part of this difference can be attributed to two explanations (Card 2001). First, because
there might be important measurement errors in the self-reported schooling of the par-
ents, the resulting downward bias could be significantly larger than the upward omitted
variable bias. Second, as mentioned previously, this IV strategy captures the effect of
reforms only on the part of the population that is induced to obtain additional schooling
by the educational reforms. Therefore, the treatment effect of parental education for this
subset of compliers is likely to be above the average marginal effect for the entire pop-
ulation.20 The ratios of the IV estimates to the OLS estimates for the entire sample and
sub-samples of sons and daughters range from 1.5 to 2.4. Similar ratios have been found
in Oreopoulos et al. (2006), Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Staiger and Stock (1997).
6 Robustness checks
In this section, I perform a variety of robustness checks to test how the results change
when I modify the sample or use a different instrument (see Tables 11 and 12).
I begin by investigating whether my estimates are sensitive to WWII. The major con-
cern here is that, despite the inclusion of cohort fixed effects, the older cohorts of parents
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Table 11 Robustness checks, 2SLS estimates
Dep. Var.: Child’s Education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: Post-WWII sample of parents (1935-1956)
Parental education 0.470* 0.496* 0.558* 0.513
(0.259) (0.266) (0.293) (0.599)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.046***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 5,247 5,247 2,639 2,608
Panel B: w/o cohort F.E. for children
Parental education 0.498** 0.518* 0.603** 0.405
(0.254) (0.266) (0.279) (0.642)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.042** 0.057*** 0.026
(0.020) (0.022) (0.047)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Panel C: Parent’s years of schooling<11
Parental education 0.980** 0.982** 0.614 1.479
(0.492) (0.495) (0.603) (1.112)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.048*
(0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 2,829 2,829 1,407 1,422
Panel D: Narrowwindows around the pivotal cohorts (+/- 6 years)
Parental education 0.813*** 0.658*** 0.896*** 0.651*
(0.147) (0.188) (0.138) (0.391)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Observations 2,804 2,804 1,382 1,422
Panel E: Binary instrument
Parental education 0.334** 0.360** 0.418** 0.302
(0.153) (0.146) (0.190) (0.242)
Parental educ*female (parent) 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.036***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals)
and socio-demographic characteristics. In Panel D, for the countries with more than one reform, I consider only the most recent
reform. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
tend to be positively selected on their health and other unobservable factors because these
individuals are still alive and able to participate in the SHARE surveys. While SHARE
data do not allow for the elimination of survivor bias and the identification of a sample
entirely unaffected by WWII, I can construct a postwar sample that takes into account
the consequences of WWII that might have influenced the educational decisions of the
early cohorts of parents by leading them to interrupt or postpone their academic careers.
This postwar sample contains the younger cohorts of parents born during the 1935–1956
period. The 2SLS estimates reported in Panel A show that the effect of parental educa-
tion is slightly larger once the prewar cohorts are dropped, but this model displays an
identical pattern relative to the baseline specification (see Table 7, Panel A): the estimate
increases from 0.49 to 0.55 years once I move from the full sample to the sample of sons
and then decreases to 0.51 years and becomes insignificant when I consider the sample of
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Table 12 Robustness checks, first stage estimates
Dep. Var.: Parent’s education (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Overall Overall Sons Daughters
Panel A: Post-WWII sample of parents (1935-1956)
Compulsory education 0.228*** 0.241*** 0.321*** 0.151
(0.082) (0.083) (0.104) (0.102)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.034*** -0.039** -0.029
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 5,247 5,247 2,639 2,608
Panel B: w/o cohort F.E. for children
Compulsory education 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.301*** 0.153
(0.074) (0.077) (0.102) (0.094)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.048***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Panel C: Parent’s years of schooling<11
Compulsory education 0.145*** 0.148*** 0.166** 0.110
(0.047) (0.047) (0.071) (0.079)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.007 -0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 2,829 2,829 1,407 1,422
Panel D: Narrowwindows around the pivotal cohorts (+/- 6 years)
Compulsory education 0.222** 0.236** 0.306** 0.173
(0.094) (0.096) (0.124) (0.129)
Compulsory educ*female (parent) -0.034** -0.040* -0.028
(0.016) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 2,804 2,804 1,382 1,422
Panel E: Binary instrument
First reform 0.429*** 0.477*** 0.701*** 0.242
(0.160) (0.169) (0.225) (0.231)
Second reform 0.620*** 0.799*** 0.853** 0.710**
(0.204) (0.228) (0.343) (0.307)
First reform*female (parent) -0.107 -0.178 -0.030
(0.129) (0.163) (0.174)
Second reform*female (parent) -0.473* -0.476 -0.407
(0.273) (0.453) (0.564)
Observations 6,184 6,184 3,117 3,067
Notes: All specifications include controls for country dummies, birth cohort dummies for parents and children (in 1-year intervals),
and socio-demographic characteristics. In Panel D, for the countries with more than one reform, I consider only the most recent
reform. Standard errors clustered at the parents’ country and cohort level are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
daughters. The more pronounced impact of maternal education on children’s schooling
persists, consistent with the baseline specification. Therefore, the results are quite robust
to excluding the prewar cohorts.
I also investigate the robustness of my results to the exclusion of the child’s year of birth.
There might be a concern that the year of the child’s birth is an endogenous decision
because it may be affected by the level of parental education. In Panel B, I show that
the coefficients of interest are very similar to the main specification with regard to the
direction, magnitude and significance, with the only difference being that the mother’s
schooling no longer has an impact on daughters.
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As a third check, following Black et al. (2005) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006), I conduct
the analysis on the sample of the less educated parents who are most likely to be affected
by reforms in mandatory schooling. Therefore, I examine the subset of children whose
parents have 11 or fewer years of education. The 2SLS estimates presented in Panel C
are similar in direction and significance to the benchmark specification, but the results
are much less statistically precise. The lack of precision of the estimates is largely due
to the small sample size. Contrary to my expectation, I find the estimated coefficients to
be much larger in magnitude: the reduced number of observations is likely to bias my
results, thus limiting this type of analysis. The first stage estimates (see Table 12, Panel C)
indicate, as expected, that compulsory schooling laws are strongly correlated with lower
levels of parental schooling, except for daughters.
While the small sample size severely limits the possibility of using cross-country school
reforms as a regression discontinuity, one can imagine taking a narrowwindow of parental
birth cohorts around the pivotal cohorts to correct for the impact of any long-run trends
across birth cohorts. To do this, I restrict the sample to children with their parents born
six years before or after the change in the laws.21 The results reported in Panel D are
consistent with my baseline model: I find evidence of a causal impact, although larger in
magnitude, of parental education and a larger impact of maternal education on children’s
schooling.
As a final check, I assess the sensitivity of my estimates to the use of an alternative def-
inition of the instrument. I construct a binary reform variable which is set to one for a
given country for the post-reforms cohorts of parents, i.e., if parental year of birth exceeds
the pivotal cohort. This allows me to distinguish between the treated and untreated











where the variable Treatpij is now an indicator that takes value 1 if parent i who resides in
country j belongs to a birth cohort that was exposed to the schooling reform. This implies
that the treated individuals are born after the pivotal cohort. Importantly, some countries
implemented more than one compulsory schooling law during my observation period:
two laws were implemented in Sweden and France and three laws were implemented in
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. For the group of countries with more than one
reform, I construct a treatment dummy for each additional reform using the same proce-
dure as defined in (6).22 Therefore, the number of indicators corresponds to the number
of within country reforms. For the analysis in this study, it is important to note that the
indicators are set to zero when additional reforms did not take place in a given coun-
try. One weakness of this binary instrument compared to the previous instrument based
on the years of compulsory schooling is that it does not adequately capture the magni-
tude of the reform: a reform raising the number of years of compulsory schooling by one
year (Austria, for example) is treated in the same manner as a reform increasing compul-
sory schooling by more than one year (Italy, for example). In this setup, the first stage is
given by:
Edupihj = δ0 + δ1Treatpij,l + πXihj + ϕp + ϕc + σj + υihj, l = 1, 2 (7)
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as mentioned above, Treatpij,l is a binary variable that equals 1 if the parent i in country j
was affected by the l − th educational reform and 0 otherwise.
The results are presented in Panel E. As expected, themagnitude of the effect of parental
education is smaller than in the benchmark specification (see Table 7, Panel A), but, most
importantly, the estimated coefficients remain unchanged with respect to the direction
and significance in the full sample as well as in the sub-samples of sons and daughters.
7 Discussion
In this study, I found that maternal education is more important than paternal education
for the academic achievement of children. While this finding is consistent with the estab-
lished IV literature on the intergenerational transmission of human capital (Black et al.
2005; Chevalier 2004; Chevalier et al. 2011), the mechanisms through which a mother’s
educationmay affect her child’s education are not entirely clear. In their studies, Chevalier
(2004) and Chevalier et al. (2011) emphasize that the stronger effects of maternal educa-
tion can be largely explained by the role of the mother as the main provider of childcare
within the family. For example, mothers tend to spendmore time breastfeeding, reading to
their children, helping them with homework, and taking them outside. As noted by Black
et al. (2003), this stronger effect of maternal education could also be attributed to other
mechanisms such as positive assortative mating or the quantity/quality trade-off. How-
ever, because educated mothers are more likely to work, they may also have less time to
stay at home and less time to devote to child care. However, Carneiro et al. (2013) counter
that more educated mothers do not spend less time with their children partly because
they have fewer children or less leisure time. They conclude that increased employment
among more educated mothers does not have negative effects on children.
Whether it is plausible to assume that the intergenerational mobility coefficient is the
same across different countries remains unexplored. To account for cross-country hetero-
geneity in parents’ education, I add to model (1) a full set of interactions between parental
years of schooling and the country dummies instrumented by the corresponding inter-
actions between years of compulsory schooling and the country indicators. I then test
the joint significance of this array of country-specific slopes in parental years of educa-
tion and demonstrate that I do not reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effect of
parental schooling is the same for all countries.23 An alternative strategy to allow for the
maximum level of heterogeneity at the country level would be to estimate separate mod-
els for each country. However, the number of observations in each country is too small
to identify the treatment effects of parental education.24 Overall, the evidence presented
above suggests that the IV strategy on the pooled sample with common coefficients on all
the variables is most appropriate for the data used in the present investigation.
8 Conclusion
An important component of human capital can be assessed by the extent of individu-
als’ academic careers, measured by the number of years of education. When considering
policies that improve the educational outcomes of new generations, a key question con-
cerns the causal role of parents’ education in influencing the educational outcomes of
their offspring, that is, the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Does the
increased education of parents cause higher levels of education of their children? Or, is
the observed correlation between parents’ and children’s levels of education naive and due
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to unobserved covariates, such as innate ability? Are there differences in the education
effects of mothers versus fathers, on daughters versus sons?
Although a large literature has attempted to answer these questions, the evidence
remains largely mixed. In this paper, I employ the changes in compulsory schooling laws
in Europe over the period 1920–1956 to explore the effect of parental education on the
schooling performance of their children. In my preferred model, I do find some evidence
of a causal relationship between parental and children’s education. Specifically, I find that
an additional year of parental education induced by the reform generates 0.44 years of
additional schooling for their children. Furthermore, I provide evidence that the mother’s
schooling has a stronger impact than her husband’s in determining the educational suc-
cess of their offspring. This latter result is robust to the inclusion of the country-specific
trends.
The findings of this paper reveal that increasing the education of less educated parents
might have beneficial effects not only on the targeted generation but also on the educa-
tional outcomes of the next generation because family background characteristics affect
the process of intergenerational transmission of human capital. These results highlight the
long-term effectiveness of compulsory schooling laws in improving intergenerational out-
comes in education. A mother’s stronger influence over children’s education suggests that
supporting the education of mothers may represent an important avenue for educational
policies.
Endnotes
1 A more detailed summary of the literature on each identification strategy may be
found in Holmlund et al. (2011); Björklund and Salvanes (2010); and Black and Devereux
(2010). In particular, Holmlund et al. (2011) argue that the conflicting results across
these three literatures arise mostly from the different identification strategies rather
than from differences in the countries that have been studied.
2 Altogether, 15 countries are covered by the first and the second waves, but I consider
only a sub-group of 9 countries for which I have information on educational reforms
during the period between 1920 and 1956. Following Brunello et al. (2012), I exclude
Spain and Greece because the compulsory schooling laws occurred too late to identify a
treatment group.
3 The listed year corresponds to the year when a certain reform was passed, which
may not be equal to year of implementation (e.g., the Austrian reform of 1962 was
implemented in 1966; the French reform of 1959 was implemented in 1967).
4 More details on the educational reforms in the Netherlands can be found in van
Kippersluis et al. (2011) and Brunello et al. (2012).
5 Pischke and von Wachter (2008) for more information on the educational reforms in
the West German states.
6 See http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm
for details on ISCED coding.
7 The conversion table for the Czech Republic, which is not present in the Release
Guide 2.5.0 for waves 1 and 2, was provided by the SHARE Country Team for the Czech
Republic.
8 After 1956, there is a substantial drop in the number of family respondents. The
reason is that SHARE interviews people who are 50+. Therefore, for the 2006 wave, the
people targeted by SHARE were born in 1956 or before.
9 The family respondents answer the questions of the children’s section. The couple’s
first person interviewed is the family respondent in the coverscreen. Because the family
respondents are selected exclusively on the basis of the chronological order of interviews
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per couple, the sample of parents can be arguably considered as a random sample. For
further details, please see the Release Guide 2.5.0 for waves 1 and 2.
10 In SHARE, questions about children’s education are asked for a maximum of four
children. Table A3 in Additional file 1: Appendix A displays the cross-country
distribution of first-born and later-born children and Additional file 1: Table A4 reports
the descriptive statistics. Importantly, in Additional file 1: Tables A5 and A6 I show that
the main results remain substantially unchanged when including all children, both
first-born and later-born children, thereby making my results relevant beyond the
first-born children.
11 The first SHARE interview took place in 2004 for all countries with the exception of
the Czech Republic, which was surveyed in 2006. Table A7 in Additional file 1:
Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics for children born after 1980 that are
excluded from the analysis. As expected, the sample size is greatly reduced because
there is a small fraction of parents that had their children after 1980.
12 All of these samples contain individuals for whom information on educational
attainment is not missing. Table A1 in Additional file 1: Appendix A reports the number
of observations that are lost due to missing data on parents’ and children’s years of
schooling for each country. Overall, it is reassuring to notice that the total number of
missing values is relatively very low (87 individuals). Additional file 1: Table A2 reports
the distribution of the postwar sample of parents across the countries.
13 Because my sample includes only one Southern European country (Italy) and only
one Eastern European country (Czech Republic), I included these two countries in a
separate row with the Western European countries.
14 One might argue that the birth year of the child is a potentially endogenous variable
because parents can choose the timing of birth. However, in the robustness checks I
show that the main results hold even when excluding cohort fixed effects for children.
15 The fact that the identification of the effects of the reforms is made possible
through differences in the timing of the changes in these laws across countries suggests
some similarities with a differences-in-differences design.
16 As for Germany, given that the instrument varies at the state level, clustering occurs
at the level of the West German states. However, to account for potential correlation
across West German states, I also cluster at the level of Germany finding that the 2SLS
standard errors are virtually identical. Additionally, these standard errors do not change
remarkably using the robust option without clustering.
17 See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
18 Because my model is just-identified, the conditional likelihood-ratio (CLR) test
converges to the AR test, so there is no need to report both. In cases where the IV model
contains more than one instrumental variable, additional weak-instrument robust tests,
such as the LM test, are presented. Notice that these tests can only be applied to a model
with one endogenous variable. A discussion of these issues can be found in Finlay et al.
(2009).
19 The Angrist-Pischke first stage F-test statistic refers to the first stage regression of
parental education. The first stage regression of the interaction parental
education*female has a much stronger power. Therefore, its Angrist-Pischke first stage F
is omitted.
20 An additional explanation is that there might be some correlation between the
instrument and the unobserved factors that affect a child’s outcome. However, previous
studies using this variation have not questioned the exclusion restriction of the
instrument.
21 For the countries with more than one reform, I consider only the most recent reform.
22 The third reform will not be used for causal interpretation because its identification
would come only from the Czech Republic and the Netherlands.
23 The results are available from the author upon request.
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24 The results are available from the author upon request. This country-specific
analysis is usually not conducted in the economic literature using SHARE data (see, for
example, Alessie et al. 2013; Brunello et al. 2009,2011,2012). Furthermore, the inclusion
of only one country in the Mediterranean area (Italy) and one in Eastern Europe (Czech
Republic) makes it difficult to produce separate estimates by European regions.
Additional file
: Appendix A: Supplemental Tables.
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